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Abstract
We provide su￿cient conditions for the validity of the ￿rst-order approach for two period
dynamic moral hazard problems, where the agent can save and borrow secretly. We show that in
addition to the concavity requirements for the standard moral hazard problem, non-increasing
absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility functions and Frisch elasticity of leisure less than one
imply that the agent’s problem is jointly concave in e￿ort and asset decisions when facing the
optimal contract. We also characterize the optimal contract in detail. One of the key observation
is that the possibility of hidden asset accumulation makes the supporting tax-transfer system
more regressive (or the optimal compensation scheme more convex) under a general class of
preferences (HARA).
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This paper has two targets. First, we provide su￿cient conditions for the validity of the ￿rst-order
approach (FOA) for two period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and
borrow secretly, and we characterize the optimal contract. Second, we study the implication for
optimal income taxation of hidden/anonymous access to the credit market (or the availability of a
storage technology).
Recently, dynamic principal-agent models became very popular instruments to study several
diverse issues such as design of optimal social insurance schemes (e.g. unemployment insurance,
and disability insurance), bank-￿rm ￿nancing relationships, e￿cient compensation contracts, and
optimal capital taxation. Most of these models assume that the agent’s consumption-savings de-
cision is observable (and fully contractable) by the principal. However, it is also well-known that
this assumption is potentially very dangerous, because if the agent is given a hidden (or not con-
tractable) opportunity to save then he would deviate from the optimal contract by saving (and
possibly exerting less e￿ort) (Rogerson, 1985a). Therefore, the possibility of hidden asset accumu-
lation will lead to a di￿erent optimal contract. This problem is also relevant empirically, as in most
of the above-mentioned applications, the contractability and observability of asset accumulation
cannot be guaranteed.
The FOA consists in replacing the incentive compatibility constraints of the agent by the cor-
responding ￿rst-order necessary conditions from the agent’s decision problem. Since the seminal
works by Mirrlees (1971) and Holmstr￿ om (1979) it became obvious that the study of the moral
hazard models is much easier if one can rely on the ￿rst-order condition approach (FOA). The
simpli￿cation of the incentive compatibility constraint becomes even more important in a dynamic
environment when the principal faces an additional information problem because the agent has
secret access to the credit market. Rogerson (1985b) and Jewitt (1988) provide conditions for the
validity of the FOA for the static principal-agent model. Their strategy is to show that when facing
the optimal contract, the agent’s problem is concave hence the ￿rst order conditions are actually
not only necessary but also su￿cient for the optimality of the agent’s decisions.
It is not known under what conditions the FOA can be applied to multi-period principal-agent
problems with hidden asset accumulation. In fact, Kocherlakota (2004) ￿nds cases (linearity of
both the e￿ort cost and the e￿ort’s impact on output) where - although the standard conditions
that guarantee the validity of the ￿rst-order approach in the static model are veri￿ed - the agent’s
problem is not concave when he is allowed to enter the credit market. Intuitively, the non-concavity
1is a consequence of potential bene￿ts from jointly decreasing e￿ort and increasing savings. The
necessary ￿rst-order conditions may not capture these second-order gains. In this paper, we provide
su￿cient conditions for the two-period model under which the agent’s problem is concave when
facing the optimal contract and therefore the incentive compatibility constraint for the agent’s
decisions can be replaced by its necessary and su￿cient ￿rst-order conditions. In particular, we
show that within the family of non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility functions in
consumption, a strong concavity condition on the distribution function together with the ‘spanning
condition with dominance’ proposed by Grossman and Hart (1983) guarantees that the FOA is
applicable. We also show that the concavity condition we impose on the probability distribution
is essentially equivalent to a requirement on the utility function of leisure such that the Frisch
elasticity of leisure is less than unity. Our conditions imply that most of the (additively separable)
utility functions and many e￿ort speci￿cations used in applications allow for a ￿rst order condition
representation of the problem. Further, empirical studies seem to con￿rm both the NIARA and
the Frisch elasticity condition.
We provide two main characterization results. First, we show that as opposed to hidden infor-
mation moral hazard models (see Allen, 1985 and Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001) self-insurance is
not optimal in this environment. This result is general in the sense that it does not even require
the validity of the FOA. Second, we show that, similarly to the pure moral hazard case with ob-
servable assets, under the standard monotone likelihood ratio condition, consumption is monotone
increasing in income. We also study extensively the curvature of the optimal consumption alloca-
tion as a function of income. This is particularly important, because the curvature determines the
progressivity of the supporting tax-transfer system. Our main conclusion is that, under preferences
of the linear risk tolerance class (HARA), the possibility of the hidden asset accumulation makes
(certeris paribus) the optimal consumption a more convex function of income, hence under hidden
asset accumulation the optimal tax system becomes more regressive (or less progressive) compared
to the case where asset accumulation is observable. Intuitively, the principal would like to discour-
age the agent form using hidden savings and exerting smaller e￿ort. To discourage savings, not
only consumption has to be more backloaded (second period consumption needs to increase) com-
pared to the case when savings are observable. We ￿nd that whenever the coe￿cient of absolute
risk aversion is decreasing and convex (HARA utility functions), the optimal distribution of these
consumption increases across income levels makes consumption more convex. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper constitutes the ￿rst attempt to study the implication of hidden savings for
2optimal income taxation.1
In addition to allowing a sharp characterization of the optimal contract, ￿nding conditions
for the validity of the ￿rst order approach is important for at least two other reasons. First, as
explained in ￿ Abrah￿ am and Pavoni (2008), Werning (2001, and 2002), and Kocherlakota (2004), the
￿rst order approach is crucial for being able to write the problem in a tractable recursive form.
Second, it can be shown that whenever the ￿rst order approach is valid the optimal tax on asset
holdings takes a simple form. In particular, imposing linear taxes on savings which are uniform
across ex-post shocks is optimal.2
Unfortunately, our analytical results for the two period model cannot be easily extended to a
framework with more than two periods. In ￿ Abrah￿ am and Pavoni (2008), we propose a recursive
reformulation of the multi-period (or in￿nite horizon) problem based upon the ￿rst-order condition
representation and verify the validity of the ￿rst-order condition approach ex post, numerically.
This paper constitutes a ￿rst step toward the analytical study of this class of dynamic moral
hazard models, which already provides important insights about the problem. In fact, virtually all
existing papers that study the moral hazard problem with hidden asset trade or storage analytically,
either use very special closed form solutions or use two period models.3
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other paper which studies systematically the
issue of the validity of the ￿rst-order approach in this class of models. Williams (2006) gives
1In contrast, there is a relatively large literature that uses this class of models to study the implications for
optimal capital income taxation (e.g., Golosov et al., 2003; Kocherlakota, 2005, Albanesi and Sleet, 2006; Golosov
and Tsyvinski, 2007; and Gottardi and Pavoni, 2008)
2This observation is almost implicit in Kocherlakota (2005), and it has been shown to be true for a wide set of
assets by Gottardi and Pavoni (2007). In the latter, it is also shown that this simple tax system implies a positive
(expected) tax on capital.
3In a two period principal agent relationship, Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) show that hidden access to the credit
market reduces total welfare with respect to the no asset market case. They focus on the possibility of increasing
welfare by allowing the entrepreneur to default on the debt. Bisin and Rampini (2006) study the e￿ect of bankruptcy
provision, in a two period model similar to that of Bizer and DeMarzo, where agents have hidden access to insurance
contracts and can default on the principal insurer as well. In addition to no-default, we do not allow agents to
secretly trade assets other than a risk free bond. Chiappori et al. (1994) and more recently Park (2004) analyze the
optimal contract with discrete e￿ort. They ￿nd that - under some conditions - a renegotiation-proof contract always
implements the minimum level of e￿ort. We consider a continuous-e￿ort model, where the planner can commit
not to renegotiate the contract ex post. Kocherlakota (2004) characterizes the optimal UI transfer scheme in an
in￿nite horizon two-output moral hazard model with hidden savings, where agents’ preferences are linear in e￿ort,
and e￿ort a￿ects linearly job-￿nding probabilities. Werning (2002) solves analytically a similar two-output model
with multiplicative separable CARA utility. We consider a two period model which allows for both a general class of
preferences and a much more general production technology.
3su￿cient conditions for the validity of the FOA for a large set of continuous time principal-agents
models. There are few important di￿erences between our approach and that of Williams that make
the two papers complementary to each other. First, although his conditions are stated for a very
large set of models and for any time horizon, they are not satis￿ed in a context where there is
a linear return/storage technology for assets such as assumed here. Second, Williams focuses on
the dynamic aspects of the problem and - as in most of the literature in continuous time models
- considers a stochastic production technology with normally distributed shocks (the Brownian
model). We focus on the two period problem with shocks on a bounded support but allow for
virtually any distribution function and any pattern for the likelihood ratios over the support.4
The next section presents the model and derive minimal conditions for optimality. Then we
introduce the ￿rst-order condition approach and provide conditions for the concavity of the agent’s
problem in the optimum in Section 3. In Section 4, we study the curvature of consumption and
its implications fort optimal income taxation in presence of hidden savings. Further analysis of
the optimal contract and a discussion about possible extensions is provided in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model
Consider a relationship between a risk neutral principal/planner and a risk averse agent, that
lasts for two periods: t = 0;1. The model builds on the typical dynamic moral hazard problem
and assumes that consumption occurs at the beginning of each period (together with the e￿ort
decision).5
Preferences The agent derives utility from consumption ct ￿ c ￿ ￿1 and e￿ort et ￿ 0
according to: u(ct) ￿ v(et); where both u and v are strictly increasing and twice continuously
di￿erentiable functions, and u is strictly concave whereas v is convex. We normalize v(0) = 0. The
agent’s discount factor will be denoted by ￿ ￿ 0:
4Schattler and Jaryoung (1997) discuss how removing the assumption of Brownian motion in the standard
principal-agent model in continuos time changes the properties of the optimal contract. Schattler and Jaryoung
(1997) also con￿rm the ￿nding in Mirrlees (1975) and show that for any ‘discretization’ of the continuous time model,
the problem with normally distributed shocks is not well de￿ned. In particular, the optimal contract approximates
arbitrarily well the ￿rst best allocation by imposing extreme punishments and rewards upon events with very small
probability.
5This timing is very common, for example, in the optimal unemployment insurance literature (e.g., Hopenhayn
and Nicolini, 1997).
4Production and endowments At date t = 0; the agent has a ￿xed endowment y0: At
date t = 1; there are N possible output levels Y := fy1; :::; yNg with yi < yi+1: The realization
yi 2 Y is publicly observable, while the probability distribution over Y is a￿ected by the agent’s
unobservable e￿ort level e0 that is exerted at t = 0. The conditional probabilities are de￿ned by the
smooth functions:6 pi(e0) := Prfy = yi j e0g: As in most of the the optimal contracting literature,
we assume full support, that is pi(e0) > 0 for all i = 1;:::;N; and all e0: There is no production or
any other action at t ￿ 2:
Markets At each date, the agent can buy or (short)-sell a risk-free bond bt which costs q
consumption units today and pays one unit of consumption tomorrow. The agent has no access to
any other insurance market other than that delivered by the principal (exclusivity). We assume
that asset decisions and consumption levels are private information to the agent.
Given the structure of the problem, the agent will never be able to borrow at t = 1 hence
b1 ￿ 0: Monotonicity of preferences will guarantee that the agent does not want to leave any
positive amount of assets at date 1 either. So b1 = 0 for all states i. Similarly, since v is strictly
increasing, e1 = 0 at all i:






where ￿0 and ￿i represent the transfers the individual receives in period t = 0 and in period
t = 1 conditional on realization yi, respectively. To simplify the analysis, we separate the prin-
cipal’s transfer plan from the components of the allocation under the agent’s control, which are
￿ :=(e0;b0). Given W; the agent’s utility is
U(e0;b0;￿) := u(y0 + ￿0 ￿ qb0) ￿ v(e0) + ￿
N X
i=1
pi(e0)[u(yi + ￿i + b0)]: (1)
Recall that a key assumption in our model is that the planner cannot observe how the agent
allocates his income y0 + ￿0 between consumption c0 and asset accumulation qb0: As usual, to
guarantee solvency of the agent for every contingency, we impose the ‘natural’ borrowing limit:
b0 ￿ c ￿ mini=1;::N fyi + ￿ig:7
6In particular, we require the function p : E ! ￿





N j x ￿ 0and
P
i xi = 1
￿
.
7The enforceability of the repayment of debt obtained through anonymous credit lines is an important and delicate
issue, which is common to many environments and that we do not address here. With minor modi￿cations to the
analysis, one could just impose b0 ￿ 0; which could be enforced in an anonymous credit market. In this this case,
asset accumulation could also be interpreted as a private storage technology. At the end of the paper, we will consider
the case with liquidity constraints more in detail.
5The risk neutral planner faces the same credit market as the agent, therefore her discount rate
is q. Her preferences/pro￿ts are




E￿ciency An optimal contract is the contract that maximizes the principal’s discounted
expected pro￿ts, that is8
V (U0) := max
W
V (e0;b0;￿); (3)
subject to the participation constraint
U(e0;b0;￿) ￿ U0; (4)





U(e;b;￿) s.t. e ￿ 0; y0 + ￿0 ￿ c ￿ qb ￿ ￿q min
i
fyi + ￿i ￿ cg
￿
: (5)
We will denote this problem as (P). In order to make the problem of some interest, we assume that
U0 > ￿1:
Note, that there is indeterminacy in the contract between ￿0 and b0. The planner can imple-






and with the contract
n
￿0 ￿ ";f￿i + "=qg
N
i=1 ;e0;b0 ￿ "=q
o
: In other words, since the planner and the agent face the same
return in the credit market there are a continuum of optimal contracts. In this paper, without a loss
of generality, we will study the one speci￿c optimal contract which implements b0 = 0: Because of
these observations, we will sometimes refer to the combination of e0 and ci := yi+￿i; i = 0;1;2;:::N
as a contract.
We can interpret this setup in several di￿erent ways. First, this framework may describe a
private insurance relationship, where y0 is the agent’s (veri￿able) initial net wealth and he can
a￿ect future outcomes by his action e0. The insurance company is the principal, who o￿ers a
contract, which will imply an initial fee (￿0) and a (net) insurance payment (￿i) dependent on the
realized state. In this case, if we set U0 such a way, that V (U0) = 0; the insurance contract will
deliver zero pro￿ts to the insurance company. When designing the conditions of the contract, the
insurer has to take into account that the agent can in￿uence the likelihood of the di￿erent events. In
addition, in our environment, the insurer cannot observe the agent’s consumption either, therefore
8Existence can be shown, for example, by a simple extension to Grossman and Hart (1983) by assuming un upper
bound on e0 and unbounded below u.
6the optimal insurance contract has to take into account that the agent is able to transfer resources
intertemporally through the credit market.
Another interpretation is a two-period compensation contract, where yi is the surplus which
can be divided by a risk-neutral owner/shareholder and a risk-averse worker/manager. In this
case, yi + ￿i is the wage of the worker in a given state and date, while V (U0) is the pro￿t of the
owner. Here again, the wages have to provide the right incentives for the agent to exert high e￿ort.
Moreover, high punishments (low wages) for low second period surpluses may not be incentive
compatible because the worker can save against them at date t = 0:
Alternatively, and this is our preferred application, we can interpret this relationship as an
optimal tax/transfer provision problem (social insurance), where the principal is a benevolent
social planner whose objective is to maximize the welfare of the citizens. The (small open) economy
contains a continuum of ex ante identical agents who face the above contract and can in￿uence their
date 1 income realizations by working hard or shirk. The planner o￿ers a tax/transfer system to
insure them against idiosyncratic risk and, at the same time, provide them appropriate incentives
for working hard. In this case, setting U0 such a way that V (U0) = 0 would be the socially optimal
allocation. Since, for this application, (3) can be interpreted as the social planner’s dynamic budget
constraint, by the law of large numbers V (U0) = 0 is equivalent to an (intertemporal) balanced
budget requirement.
The main implications of this framework are known when hidden borrowing and lending are
not allowed. We will brie￿y review them below. However, Rogerson (1985a) has shown that in
this setup, the agent is left with incentives to save in the optimal contract. That implies that the
optimal allocation of this model is di￿erent from the ones where asset accumulation is observable and
contractable or not allowed. Moreover, in all of the three above examples private (non-observable,
non-contractable or non-taxable) savings are empirically relevant. Neither insurance companies
nor shareholders/owners can control the agent’s consumption saving decision, however their wealth
level a￿ects the e￿ectiveness of the incentive scheme. Finally, typically governments cannot have a
full control over agents’ consumption saving decisions either, because agents can keep their savings
in low-interest (and not observable) instruments such as local and foreign currency or they can
have access to foreign accounts.
72.1 Preliminary Characterization and Self-insurance
Under very general conditions (in particular without requiring that the ￿rst order approach is valid)
one can prove that transfers ￿i cannot uniformly increase with yi:9
Proposition 1 (Minimal Insurance) If u is unbounded below or above, and c > ￿1; then ￿i
cannot be monotone increasing (not even weakly increasing) with yi for all i.
The intuition is as follows. A transfer scheme that has the property of ￿i increasing for all i
cannot be optimal since the planner could twist the scheme so that to decrease ￿i in states with
large yi and increase it in bad states (states with low yi). Since the agent is risk averse and the
planner is risk neutral, we expect the principal to gain by absorbing some of the income risk the
agent faces. In particular, the principal should be able to provide more insurance to the agent that
he can achieve without the principal’s participation.
Proposition 1 has a somewhat important consequence. Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota
(2001) study the e￿ect of hidden asset accumulation in a hidden information moral hazard model.
They ￿nd that the constrained e￿cient allocation does not di￿er from that in a ‘pure bond economy,’
i.e., the allocation the agents could obtain by insuring themselves through borrowing and lending,
without the planner’s provision of additional insurance. In terms of our optimal taxation examples,
this result would imply that the planner have no role in enhancing welfare as the only incentive
compatible allocation will provide no additional insurance to the agents compared to a pure bond
economy.
Note however that a pure bond economy would correspond to a situation of constant ￿i = ￿
for i = 1;2;::N: Proposition 1 hence shows that this is cannot be the case for our ‘hidden action’
moral hazard model.
Corollary to Proposition 1 (Impossibility of Self-Insurance) Under the assumptions in Propo-
sition 1, the optimal contract never delivers the self insurance allocation.
Since the contract ￿i ￿ ￿ is available to the principal, an equivalent way of stating the result
is as follows. If we let U0 be the utility value obtainable by the agent under self-insurance, we
have V (U0) > 0. What is then the key di￿erence between the hidden information and the hidden
action moral hazard models that generates this contrasting implications? As it is clear from our
line of proof, the full support assumption plays a major role in the result. Under this condition, the
9All the the proofs not shown in the main text can be found in the Appendix.
8agent has incomplete control over the realizations yi: Hence, the planner can implement schemes
that impose a tax payment in some states and a transfer in others in such a way that the agent is
not able to avoid paying the taxes with certainty. Clearly, this result extends to any multi-period
setting.10
Unfortunately, one cannot characterize the optimal contract much further analytically without
the use of the ￿rst-order approach. In the next section we will introduce this approach and provide
su￿cient conditions for its validity. In Section 4, we then use the ￿rst order approach to characterize
the optimal contract in greater detail.
3 The First-Order Approach
It is not di￿cult to see that condition (5) describes a complicated set of constraints: it is equiva-
lent to a bidimensional continuum of inequalities. The ￿rst order approach replaces the incentive
constraint (5) for the corresponding stationary points of the agent’s maximization problem with
respect to e0 and b0: This strategy brings the number of inequality constraints down to only two.
In what follows, we will assume interiority of the optimal contract, that is we assume that the
original problem (P) has a solution consumption levels strictly above 0 in both dates and for all
states and that e0 > 0. It is easy to see that the moral hazard problem is not interesting if the
optimal e￿ort is the minimal e￿ort.11 We will follow Rogerson (1985b) and replace the incentive




The intuition for the above conditions is simple. There are two key restrictions we impose on the
10Moreover, consistently with the previous intuition, in AP we show that, in fact, the full-support assumption is
not required. It su￿ces to exclude the possibility of distributions over Y which are degenerate at one state i for some
e.
11Interiority may be required for a more technical reason. As emphasized by Mirrlees (1975), when the solution to
the original problem is at the corner then the ￿rst order approach might fail to deliver even necessary conditions for
an optimum. In our case, we could guarantee interiority in e￿ort by assuming that e is taken within an open set as in
Jewitt (1988). Alternatively, we could avoid the complications due to the corner solution by assuming that v
0 (0) = 0:
In this case, it is very easy to see that for e0 = 0 both the optimal contract and the solution obtained using the FOA
will deliver full insurance. Interiority with respect to consumption can be guaranteed by imposing that consumption
is chosen within an open interval (as in Grossman and Hart, 1983), or by requiring that limc!c u
0(c) = ￿1:
9contract. First, we guarantee that the agent is not willing to reduce his e￿ort level or shirk. The
second condition is the usual inequality version of the Euler equation: we require the agent not
willing to save.
Notice, that both above constraints depend on the agent’s equilibrium choices of consumption
and e￿ort alone. Given our normalization on b0 = 0; it will indeed be convenient to describe the
principal agent relationship as one where the principal decides directly the consumption level of
the agent at each state. We de￿ne c :=fcig
N
i=0 and rewrite the planner problem as
max
e0;c V (e0;0;c)









pi(e0)u0(ci) ￿ 0; (8)
where ci := yi + ￿i; and the participation constraint (4), or
U(e0;0;c) ￿ U0:
The expressions V (e0;0;c) and U(e0;0;c) have the obvious meaning.12 This problem will be
denoted by (R). We refer to this second problem as relaxed, because the set of contracts that
satisfy the constraints of (R) contains the set of contracts that satisfy the constraints of the original
problem (P). The remaining of this section is devoted to provide conditions under which the solution
to the relaxed problem (R) is identical to the solution of the original (unrelaxed) problem (P) given
by equations (3) to (5).
Until now, there were not known conditions for discrete time models under which the above ￿rst-
order conditions are necessary and su￿cient for incentive compatibility. In ￿ Abrah￿ am and Pavoni
(2008), we approach this issue by a numerical ex post veri￿cation procedure for generic multi-period
12They are the analogous to V (e0;0;￿) and U (e0;0;￿): For example, we have




With this notation, the constraints in (6) can also be written as
Ue(e0;0;c) ￿ 0;
Ub(e0;0;c) ￿ 0:
10problems. However, that procedure requires a numerical solution of the problem. There, we also
consider the case u(c;e) = ￿expf￿￿c + g (e)g; with g increasing and convex. These preferences
are not additive separable and therefore we cannot directly apply our approach, however it is easy
to see that the ￿rst order approach is valid under even less restrictive assumptions in this case, and
that the validity of the FOA in this case extends to any multiperiod setting. For further details,
we demand the reader to ￿ Abrah￿ am and Pavoni (2008).
Williams (2006) provides su￿cient conditions for concavity for a class of continuous time models
with and without hidden savings. The key distinction between his approach and the one followed
here, is that he provides su￿cient conditions for the cases where either the price of the bond q is
not constant but a convex function of b; or q is constant but the agent’s utility directly depends on
wealth in a strictly concave way.
We will ￿nd su￿cient conditions for concavity in two steps. First, we will characterize the
‘relaxed’ optimal contract (R) by imposing the agent’s ￿rst-order conditions instead of (5). Then,
we prove that, under appropriate conditions, date 1 consumption (ci) of the agent is changing
monotonically with his income (yi): Finally, we will show that under somewhat stricter conditions,
monotonicity of consumption implies that the agent’s problem is concave in the relaxed optimal
contract. This will imply that under this set of stricter conditions our use of the ￿rst-order condition
approach is actually justi￿ed as the solution to (R) also constitutes a solution to (P).
3.1 Monotonicity of Consumption
We start by analyzing the properties of consumption based on the relaxed problem (R). We need
to ￿rst introduce some well known properties of the probability shifting functions p and the utility
function, which we will use extensively later. We will make use of the following assumptions.
NIARA. The utility function u exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion, that is, the ratio
￿
u00(c)
u0(c) := a(ci) is non-increasing in c:
MLR. The probability shifting functions p has the monotone likelihood ratio property, that is, for
each e ￿ 0 the ratio
p0
i(e)
pi(e) is non-decreasing in i.
We can now state our second characterization result.
Proposition 2 (Monotonicity) Assume NIARA and let (c;e0) be a solution to (R). (i) Either
ci = c or ci moves together with the likelihood ratio
p0
i(e0)
pi(e0). (ii) Under MLR, ci increases with
i for i = 1;2;::;N:
11Proof. Consider problem (R), and denote by ￿; ￿ and ￿ the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated
to the constraints (7), (8), and (4) respectively. By standard conditions they are all nonnegative.
The necessary conditions for optimality (with respect to c0 and ci) are:
1
u0(c0)
￿ ￿ + ￿
qu00(c0)
u0(c0)
with equality if c0 > 0; (9)
Moreover, for i = 1;::;N we either have ci = 0; or:
q
￿u0(ci)












Note that from (10) and ￿ ￿ 0, the expression
q




pi(e0). By concavity of u and NIARA, both 1
u0 and ￿a(ci) = u00
u0 increase with ci:




The previous proposition replicates a standard result in the contract theory literature with no
access to the credit market.13 In terms of our second example, this result says that the wages are
increasing with the observed output of the agent. More generally, the ￿rst part of Proposition 2




That is, consumption only responds to the informational content of the outcome realization yi on
the e￿ort level e0. We will discuss the implications of these results in Section 4 in more detail. Note
that this contrasts the self-insurance allocation where - since taxes ￿ are constant across states -
ci moves one to one with yi regardless of the informational content of income levels. All the above
properties are strict as long as both ￿ and ￿ are strictly positive. The next Lemma establishes this
latter fact when e0 > 0:
Lemma 1 Assume NIARA and let (c;e0) be a solution to (R). Then (i) If ci > c for i = 1;2;:::N
then Ue = Ub = 0, that is, constraints (7) and (8) are both satis￿ed with equality. (ii)
If both ci > c for all i and e0 > 0; then both ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. (iii) If u satis￿es the
Inada: limc!c u0(c) = 1; then (i) holds under NIARA without the interiority requirement on
consumption.
Of course, if u is unbounded below or c = ￿1 the interiority condition ci > c can be guaranteed
a priory. Lemma 1 shows that whenever we are using the ￿rst order approach, under mild regularity
conditions we can in fact (without loss of generality) impose (6) with equality. If in addition we are
looking for interior solutions for e￿ort then the multipliers associated to the incentive constraints are
13Note that the properties of the optimal contract in the case when the agent have no access to the credit market
can be recovered from the above optimality conditions assuming ￿ = 0:
12positive. The following remark shows that the multiplier associated to the participation constraint
is positive whenever we have an interior solution for c0.
Remark It is easy to see that whenever c0 > 0 we have ￿ > 0. This is so since whenever
U(e0;0;c) > U0 the principal could always reduce c0: This modi￿cation to the contract
does not a￿ect the e￿ort incentive constraint, relaxes the Euler equation, and increases the
principal’s pro￿ts.
We now move to the issue of concavity of the agent’s problem.
3.2 Su￿cient Conditions for Global Concavity
Lemma 1 guarantees that condition (6) in (R) is satis￿ed with equality. Whenever the solution
to problem (P) is interior, a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is to have (6) satis￿ed
with equality. Since (R) solves a relaxed problem, the value associated to it cannot be lower than
that associated to (P). Therefore, if we show that the contract solving (R) is actually incentive
compatible, then we have in fact derived the optimal contract. We hence say that the ￿rst order
approach is justi￿ed whenever a solution to the relaxed problem (R) delivers a correct solution to
the original problem (P). If the agent’s problem is globally jointly concave in b and e when facing
the optimal transfer scheme ￿; the use of the ￿rst-order approach is justi￿ed as the ￿rst order
conditions of the agent’s problem become su￿cient conditions for incentive compatibility. Recall,
that given ￿; the utility of the agent for each combination (e;b) is
U(e;b;￿) := u(y0 + ￿0 ￿ qb) ￿ v(e) + ￿
X
i
pi(e)u(yi + ￿i + b): (11)
Global concavity is obviously guaranteed if the associated Hessian matrix is negative de￿nite
for all e and b; where the Hessian is given by
H :=
2
4 ￿v00(e) + ￿
PN
i=1 p00












In the previous expression, we have denoted ^ c0 := y0+￿0￿qb; and ^ ci := yi+￿i+b for i = 1;2;:::;N:
This notation emphasizes that the consumption levels in H can di￿er from those delivered by the
optimal contract (which are denoted simply as ci): Note importantly, that since the bond pays
equal amounts in each state i > 0; if in the optimal contract ci change monotonically with i then
^ ci will keep this property. In fact, for all i and j, we have that ^ ci ￿ ^ cj = ci ￿ cj.
13By the concavity of the utility function u, it is easy to see that problem is concave in b alone.
Rogerson (1985b) shows that if the distribution function is concave (CDF)14 the problem is also
concave in e alone, whenever the optimal consumption scheme is monotone in output (which is
guaranteed by MLR and NIARA). Unfortunately, the CDF and MLR conditions will not guarantee
the concavity of the agent’s problem jointly in (e;b); that will require a stronger assumption. Joint
(strict) concavity requires that the Hessian is negative de￿nite. This is not true in general, not even
under CDF and MLR.15 The previous discussion however guarantees that, under NIARA, CDF and
MLR, both entries in the main diagonal of H are negative. H is hence negative de￿nite if and only
if detH > 0.16 Now, observe the o￿-diagonal elements: ￿
P
i p0
i(e)u0(^ ci): They measure the gains
from joint deviations of postponing consumption and reducing e￿ort and vice versa (saving and
shirking). Intuitively, the problem is concave if the gains from these joint deviations are su￿ciently
small compared to the loss induced by moving away from the optimal levels of e0 and b0 in the
main diagonal. Our assumptions so far are able to deliver the following result:
Lemma 2 (i) If u satis￿es NIARA, we have
P
i p0




i (e)u(^ ci) < 0 and
detH >

















The last line of the lemma indicates that - since u is concave - we can focus on the second period
e￿ects of the deviations. In order to be able to provide simple su￿cient conditions for detH > 0,
we now impose further structure on the probability shifting functions. We assume that there exists
an increasing function 0 ￿ ￿(e) ￿ 1 such that
pi(e) = ￿(e)￿ih + (1 ￿ ￿(e))￿il (13)
with
P
i ￿ik = 1 for k = h;l and with ￿ih
￿il non-decreasing in i. This requirement is called the
‘spanning condition with dominance’, and it has been used in the literature in order to guarantee
14The de￿nition is standard. The functions fpi(e)g
N
i=1 satisfy the CDF condition if F
00
I (e) is non-negative for every
e and I ￿ N; where FI(e) =
PI
i=1 pi(e) = 1 ￿
PN
i=I+1 pi(e):
15Kocherlakota (2004), provides an additive-separable ‘linear-linear’ counter-example where he assumes that
p
00
i (e) = v











16Obviously, if the latter inequality is weak H is negative semi-de￿nite.
14monotonicity of the consumption scheme in the moral hazard model with no hidden asset accumu-
lation (see Grossman and Hart, 1983; and Atkeson, 1991). The intuition is simple: we have two
base distributions given by the vectors ￿l and ￿h; in such a way that the distribution given by
￿h ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ￿l: Intuitively, by exerting higher e￿ort the agents shifts
the probability distribution of future outcomes towards the ‘better’ distribution. Note that prob-
ability shifting functions given in (13) will satisfy the MLR and the CDF condition as long as ￿
is increasing and concave. Therefore, we know from our previous results that, if u is NIARA and
￿ is increasing and concave, then consumption is monotone and the agent’s problem is concave
in e0 and b0 individually. The following main result will establish a su￿cient condition for joint
concavity.




￿￿00(e)(1￿￿(e)) ￿ 1 for all e 2 E. Let (￿) be a transfer scheme solving (R). Then
the agent’s problem is concave when facing (￿). As a consequence, the ￿rst order approach
is justi￿ed: A contract (e0;c) solves (R) if and only if it solves the original problem (P).
Proof. First, for i = 1;2:::N let us denote ￿￿i := ￿ih ￿ ￿il, ui := u(^ ci), u0
i := u0(^ ci) and
u00
i := u00(^ ci). Also notice that (13) implies that p0(e) = ￿0(e)￿￿i and p00(e) = ￿00(e)￿￿i. Then, the


































i ] as (
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i ￿ihu00
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The last term of the previous expression is precisely f￿: Hence, the assumption f￿(e) ￿ 1 implies











2 ￿ 1. Now, we need to only prove that
17Note that we are entitled to make the simpli￿cation since ￿
00(e) < 0 and ￿￿i and ui are perfectly aligned since
both ￿￿i and ^ ci increases with i; hence ￿
00(e)
P
i ￿￿iui < 0:
15NIARA utility functions will have the property Ru ￿ 1: Note that
P
i ￿￿i = 0 and our previous
results imply that ￿￿i and ^ ci both increase with i.











2 ￿ 1 for every vector of weights
￿ such that
P
i ￿i = 0 and both ui and ￿i are either both increasing or both decreasing in
i for all i: Conversely, if u is concave and such that Ru ￿ 1 for all vectors of weights ￿ with
P
i ￿i = 0 and such that ui and ￿i are either both increasing or both decreasing in i for all i,
then u is NIARA.
Q.E.D.
In order to understand better the condition f￿(e) ￿ 1; note that by concavity and strict
monotonicity of ￿, f￿(e) > 0 for all e￿ort levels. On the other hand, a linear ￿ would clearly
violate this requirement because there f￿(e) = 1. Therefore, our restriction requires that there
is enough concavity in the probability shifting function. It should be also clear from our analysis
that the concavity condition on the function ￿ can be relaxed by imposing some strong convex-
ity conditions on v(e): When v is strongly convex, one can make appropriate change in variables
and relax the requirements on ￿. More formally, the ￿rst order approach is justi￿ed for any cou-
ple of functions ^ ￿ and ^ v (de￿ned on a set H); such that the change in variable e := ^ v (h) and




leads to a function ￿ de￿ned on the set E that has the required properties: it
is increasing and f￿(e) ￿ 1:
Following this same line of reasoning, we can explain our condition on ￿ in terms of the cost
function v. Suppose we have a function ￿ that satis￿ed our condition and v is linear. If we make
the change in units so that to obtain a linear ^ ￿ : ^ ￿(h) = h := ￿(e); hence ^ v (h) := ￿￿1 (h); we
can ask what are the properties on ^ v which are implied by the condition f￿ ￿ 1: Given a linear
relationship between h and the (expected) earnings we can interpret it as labor supply. We can
hence write the agent’s problem using an increasing concave utility function of leisure given by
￿^ v (h) := g(1 ￿ h) = ￿￿￿1 (h).18 Taking ￿rst and second derivatives of these identities, we obtain
g0(1 ￿ h) =
1
￿0(e)




Combining these equations and using the de￿nition of f￿(e) we get
￿
g00 (1 ￿ h)(1 ￿ h)





18Note that the linearity of ^ ￿ implies that h 2 [0;1] in this case.
16In other terms, f￿(e) represents the (intertemporal) elasticity of leisure. One of the most widely
used speci￿cations for g is unit elasticity one: g (1 ￿ h) = B ln(￿(1 ￿ h)); which obviously implies
f￿(e) = 1: The unit elasticity is particularly interesting since it can be obtained by inverting the
expression 1 ￿ ￿(e) = kexp(￿￿e); where ￿ = 1
B and k = 1
￿: These results might be quite useful for
applied work. First, typically applied researchers choose utilities of consumption from the NIARA
family and either use ￿(e) = 1 ￿ kexp(￿￿e) with some convex e￿ort cost function, or they use
a linear function for ￿ and a constant elasticity function for leisure. Our results suggest that for
these cases, the ￿rst-order condition approach tend to be valid under hidden savings as well, so the
optimal allocations can be characterized in greater detail. Second, empirical evidence suggests that
both of our conditions are likely to be satis￿ed in the data. Virtually all empirical estimates of
labor supply elasticity for men ￿nd it between 0 and 0:5: Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) ￿nd higher
estimates for women, but their estimates are still below one. One of the most recent structural
estimations is done by Domeij and Floden (2006) who ￿nd values for the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply between :3 and :56. To our best knowledge, all estimations for u reveal NIARA, for example
Guiso et al. (2001) ￿nd decreasing and convex relative risk aversion.
Finally, notice that the result stated in Lemma 3 has its own independent interest as it provides
a new characterizations of class of concave and NIARA utility functions. CARA utilities are
examples of utility function satisfying the condition as we have Ru = 1; regardless of the risk
aversion parameter. In order to get a more intuition about this result, assume that N = 2, hence






where ￿u(n) = u(n) (c2) ￿ u(n) (c1): If we divide both the numerator and the denominator by
(c2 ￿ c1)
2 > 0 and take the limit for c2 ! c1; we get u0u000
(u00)2. That is Ru ￿ 1 is just a di￿erence
counterpart of u0u000 ￿ (u00)
2 which is a de￿ning property of NIARA utility functions. Therefore,
intuitively, our condition expresses the requirement of non-increasing absolute risk aversion in
di￿erence terms instead of di￿erential terms.
4 Regressive Optimal Taxation
So far, we established two characterization results. Transfers cannot increasing with output for
all i, while consumption typically does (at least under MLR). We have emphasized that these
characteristics of the cross sectional consumption distribution are common to both the standard
moral hazard model and the model with hidden assets we consider in this paper. In this section,
17we characterize the curvature of the optimal consumption scheme.
Clearly, the curvature of c is closely related to the progressivity of the tax/transfer system.
Recall again, that we can ￿x b0 = 0 without loss of generality. We say that the transfer scheme ￿
is progressive (regressive) if
ci+1￿ci
yi+1￿yi is decreasing (increasing) in i. As expected, the self-insurance
allocation will have
ci+1￿ci
yi+1￿yi = 1 for all i: This de￿nition implies that whenever consumption is a
convex (concave) function of income we have a regressive (progressive) tax system supporting it.
In terms of our ￿rst period taxes and transfers ￿i, in a progressive tax system taxes (￿i < 0) are
increasing faster than income does. At the same time, for the states when the agents is receiving
a transfer (￿i > 0), transfers are increasing slower than income decreases. The opposite happens
when we have a regressive tax-transfer scheme. If the scheme is progressive, incentives are provided
more by imposing \large penalties" for low income levels, since consumption is decreasing more
for low income/output levels. On the other hand, if the scheme is regressive, then incentives are
provided by larger rewards for high output realizations because consumption is increasing more
for high output realizations. If the scheme is proportional these rewards and punishments are
balanced. The next proposition provides su￿cient conditions for the progressivity and regressivity
of the optimal transfer scheme.
Proposition 6 Assume the FOA is justi￿ed, that the optimal contract is interior and that the
likelihood ratio is monotone and convex19 (concave) and that 1
u0(c) is concave (convex) in c
and that the absolute risk aversion a(c) is decreasing and convex (constant).20 Then ￿ is
regressive (progressive).
Proof. By taking the di￿erence between (10) in two adjacent states and dividing both sides by




















By assumption the right hand side increases (decreases) with i. Since the functions in the left
hand side are increasing and concave (convex) in ci and ci+1 - by Proposition 2 - ci increases with
i; we must have that the ratio
ci+1￿ci
yi+1￿yi > 0 increases (decreases) with i. Q.E.D.

















20Notice that a function cannot be positive, decreasing and concave everywhere.
18Notice that CARA utilities with concave likelihood ratios lead to progressive schemes. Also
note, that in this case the progressivity of the payment scheme is not in￿uenced by the presence of
hidden savings since a(ci+1)￿a(ci) = 0. When the likelihood ratio is convex, CRRA utilities with
0 < ￿ ￿ 1 induce regressive schemes since a(c)(= ￿
c) is strictly convex and 1
u0
1(c) = c￿ is concave.
Interestingly, this case includes the logarithmic utility case, which - in the observable assets case
with linear likelihood ratios - would lead to proportional schemes. From (15) in that case we
get that
ci+1￿ci









=(yi+1 ￿ yi): This implies that consumption
is a linear function of income. This particular case sheds light on a more general pattern under
convex a(c): the allocation with hidden savings has a more a convex relationship between output
and consumption than the one with observable savings. In terms of the supporting tax/transfer
system, hidden asset accumulations calls for a more regressive tax scheme. In terms of providing
incentives, regressive schemes are putting more emphasis on rewards for high output levels than
punishments for low output levels: More insurance for low income levels and less insurance for
high income levels. Also notice that whenever a(c) is convex, ￿(a(ci + ￿) ￿ a(ci)) is decreasing
in i for any ￿ > 0. This implies that in order to keep ￿￿(a(ci+1) ￿ a(ci)) constant the principal
need to increase consumption more for a higher level of income (recall that ci+1 > ci). Therefore,
for all HARA utilities this e￿ect due to hidden asset accumulation always imposes an additional
regressivity to the curvature dictated by 1
u0(c).21
Corollary to Proposition 6 Assume FOA is valid and u is HARA. Let c and ^ c be interior
optimal contracts for our model with hidden asset accumulation and the pure moral hazard
model, respectively, implementing e￿ort level e0. If ^ c changes with i in a convex way, than c
does as well.
Below we provide conditions for the validity of the FOA when u is quadratic (hence not NIARA
but HARA). In order to obtain a clearer intuition of this result we examine (10) further. This
expression equates discounted present value (normalized by pi (e0)) of the principal’s costs and
bene￿ts of increasing the agent’s utility by one unit in state i > 1. This increase in utility costs the
planner q=￿u0(ci) in consumption terms. In terms of bene￿ts, ￿rst of all, since the participation





with ￿ + ￿c ￿ 0: This class includes CARA (for ￿ = 0), quadratic utility (for ￿ > 0 and ￿ = ￿1); and CRRA (for
￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0): In the latter case, ￿ represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitutions, i.e., the inverse of the
risk aversion parameter.
19constraint is relaxed, the principal receives a return of ￿. Further, increasing the agent’s utility
also relaxes the e￿ort incentive compatibility constraint generating a return of ￿p0
i(e0)=pi(e0).22
Notice that these e￿ects are present in the standard moral hazard model as well. In the hidden
asset case (￿ > 0), there is an additional gain though: by increasing u(ci), the principal also
alleviates the saving motives of the agent. This gain is measured (in consumption terms) by ￿a(ci),
and it implies that the principal, certeris paribus, increases consumption for every income state
i: Since consumption is increasing in i; decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that these gains
are getting smaller as income is getting higher, implying that the additional consumption increases
due to hidden asset accumulation are decreasing. Note, however, that the di￿erence in these gains
across income levels i and i + 1 determines the exact e￿ect of hidden asset accumulation on the
progressivity of the tax scheme. Under convex absolute risk aversion this di￿erence is shrinking,
hence, the consumption plan becomes more convex than in the standard moral hazard case.
5 Further Comparisons with the Standard Model and Extensions
In this section we analyze few other similarities and discrepancies between the two models and
￿nally we discuss few potential extensions.
The Value of Information The fact that under NIARA consumption moves with the like-
lihood ratio alone suggests that some of the previous results about the value of information in our
model satis￿es similar properties to the standard case. Here is a more formal statement.
Proposition 4 Assume NIARA, and consider an interior contract (c;e0) that is a solution of (R).
Assume that the planner receives an observable and veri￿able signal s 2 S; and suppose that
the FOA is valid in both the original and the new environment with the signal s. Then there
is a new contract fcisg
s2S
i=0;N that strictly dominates c if and only if s is informative about e0
in the sense of Holmstr￿ om (1979).23
22Of course, if the increase in the payment is done in a state with a negative likelihood ratio, this represents a cost
since the incentive constraint is in fact tightened.
23Holmstr￿ om de￿nes an additional signal s being informative about the agent’s action choice if and only if yi is
not a su￿cient statistic for (yi;s); or equivalently there does not exist a function z such that
^ pis (e) = z (yi;s)pi (e) for all yi 2 Y;s 2 S and e > 0:
















So, if s is informative cis should move with s as well. This proves one direction of the statement.






pi(e) for all i;e and s: This implies that the
e￿ort incentive constraint cannot be improved by having a consumption plan that depends on s. A
reduction of uncertainty in consumption also relaxes the savings incentive constraint since NIARA
implies that u0 is convex. Hence:
P
i pi(e0)u0(ci) ￿ u0 (pi(e0)ci). Moreover, since u1 is strictly
concave and NIARA, a reduction of uncertainty allows the principal to provide the same U0 with
a lower expected payment. Q.E.D.
We noted above that this result represents a key distinguishing feature of our model with respect
to the self-insurance framework where further insurance possibilities are not available for the agent.
In that case, consumption always moves with both i and s as long as yis changes with them,
regardless of the informational content.
Backloading As we emphasized in the introduction, one important discrepancy between our
model and the standard moral hazard model regards the inter-temporal allocation of resources.
Rogerson (1985a) has shown that, in the standard moral hazard model under additive separable
preferences, the agent’s optimal consumption allocation is such that the agent is savings constrained.
This feature itself already implies that our model must induce more backloaded consumption with
respect to the standard moral hazard model. We now establish an absolute result:
Proposition 5 Whenever ￿ ￿ q we have c0 ￿
P
i pi(e0)ci: The inequality is strict when, in addi-
tion, e0 > 0 and/or ￿ > q.
Proof. The second condition in (6) implies qu0 (c0) ￿ ￿
P
i pi (e0)u0 (ci). Since NIARA
implies that u0 is a strictly convex function of consumption, from Jensen’s inequality we have
c0 ￿
P
i pi (e0)ci with strict inequality whenever ci is not constant in i; or ￿ > q (or both). We saw
in the Proof of Lemma 1 (ii) that whenever e0 > 0 consumption cannot be constant in i: Q.E.D.
If we consider the ￿rst order conditions for the optimal contract (9) and (10) assuming ￿ = 0;
we recover the characteristics of the optimal contract in the standard case when asset holdings are
observable and fully contractable (or to save is unfeasible to the agent). Assuming interiority of the
21contract and additive separability of preferences, by multiplying (10) by pi(e) for all i and summing












Equation (16) obviously contradicts the Euler equation. Moreover, Jensen’s inequality implies that,
in this case, consumption actually decreases on average whenever 1
u0(￿) is convex, which is the case
for all CARA utility functions and all CRRA utilities with relative risk version parameters above
1:
E￿ort Level and Insurance Assume FOA is valid with e0 > 0. Taking the ￿rst order conditions





i (e0)(yi ￿ ci) + ￿Ue (e0;0;c) ￿ ￿Uee (e0;0;c) + ￿Ueb (e0;0;c) = 0:
Clearly, Ue (e0;0;c) = 0: Moreover, it is not di￿cult to see that whenever the agent’s problem
is concave in e0 then ￿￿Uee (e0;0;c)+￿Ueb (e0;0;c) < 0:24 This implies that q
P
i p0




i (e0)(yi ￿ ci) + ￿Ue (e0;0;c) > 0: If we consider ￿ as an exogenous parameter de￿ning the
relative Pareto weight of the agent, this can be interpreted as an ine￿ciency result. Because of the
informational problems, the planner implements an e￿ort level which is lower than that dictated
by production e￿ciency. This result is similar to the standard moral hazard case (see Rogerson,
1985b).
A natural question is whether the optimal scheme under hidden savings induces more or less
consumption dispersion on the agent. We realized that this question does not have an easy answer.
Intuition might suggest that since reducing consumption dispersion relaxes the savings incentives
under NIARA, we might expect a reduction of consumption dispersion. In fact, in ￿ Abrah￿ am and
Pavoni (2006), we document numerically that in the two output case (N = 2) the in￿nite horizon
version of the model, consumption is typically more dispersed in the hidden asset case. As similar
24In particular, by rearranging the necessary conditions of optimality one can show the multipliers ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0
are related as follows (details are available upon request):
￿Ueb = ￿Ubb:
Hence, the condition detH > 0 is equivalent to
(Ueb)
2 < UeeUbb , ￿￿UbbUeb < ￿
2UeeUbb , ￿Ueb < ￿Uee:
22result can be shown analytically here: For each ￿xed pair (U0;e0); the consumption dispersion is
larger in our model than in the standard case.25
5.1 Extensions
Before writing the concluding remarks we would like to discuss the relevance of some assumptions
in the model.
Liquidity Constrained Agents and Shallow Pockets Suppose that the agent is liquidity
constrained. Although the set of implementable levels of asset holdings b0 might be restricted by
the presence of liquidity constraints, all our characterization results remain valid. First, it is obvious
that given any implementable b0; the principal is able to generate the same allocation to the agent
by implementing b0
0 > b0 and adjusting transfers accordingly at no cost. Interestingly, Lemma 1
implies that whenever the FOA is valid the principal will never be able to gain by implementing a
low b0 so that to make the agent liquidity constrained. In contrast, when both the agent and the
planner faces liquidity constraints (or shallow pockets), it might be the case that Lemma 1 fails as
Ub > 0.
Quadratic Utility A quite commonly used speci￿cation for u is the quadratic one: u(c) =
￿
￿
2 (B ￿ c)




B￿c; which increases with c: Most of the previous results extend to this case as well.
Note in particular, that this utility function belongs to the HARA class, so Proposition 6 and
relative Corollary apply in full whenever the ￿rst-order approach can be applied. The optimality
conditions for problem (R) when u is quadratic are
q ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿(B ￿ ci)





25Recall that N = 2: Since e0 is ￿xed across the two models we need to keep ￿u constant across the two models.
Since c0 is ￿xed as well, the discussion regarding the backloading implies that in order to satisfy the Euler equation,
in our model we need to decrease ￿(e0)u
0 (c2) + (1 ￿ ￿(e0))u
0 (c1) compared to the standard moral hazard model.
The implication is that we must increase both c2 and c1 so that to keep ￿u constant. Since u is concave, ￿c must
increase. Now, consider U0 ￿xed, while allowing for the possibility of changing c0: Since s long as e0 is ￿xed, the
principal must adjust the optimal contract so that perhaps c0 decreases, but both c1 and c2 must increase compared
to the original contract, otherwise the agent would get an utility level below U0:
23It might hence be interesting to notice that since q ￿ ￿￿￿ > 0;26 the movements in the likelihood
ratio are re￿ected in the optimal contract in the same way as in the standard moral hazard model.
In particular, under MLR, consumption is monotone increasing in i (as in the benchmark case with
NIARA utility). A su￿cient condition for the validity of FOA in this case is f￿(e)(1￿￿(e)) ￿
1+q
2
for e ￿ 0, which is implied by f￿(e) ￿
1+q
2 since 1 ￿ ￿(e) ￿ 1.27
More General Conditions on p In this paper, we looked at conditions for the validity of
the ￿rst order approach, which allowed simple economic interpretation. Looking at the expression
of part (ii) in Lemma 2, one can notice that the key su￿cient condition for the validity of the
￿rst-order approach is that the expression below is concave in (e;b):
W (e;b) :=
X
pi (e)u(ci + b):
An alternative route is hence to look at a new set of conditions, jointly on u and p that use more
heavily the shape of the optimal contract c in i: So far, we have only used monotonicity (implied
by NIARA and MLR). In the standard moral hazard model, Jewitt (1988) derives necessary and
su￿cient conditions for c to change in a concave way with i: It then uses and extends results from
Total Positivity28 to ￿nd minimal conditions on p so that the agent problem is concave in e: The full
derivation of minimal conditions on the concavity of the agent problem jointly in (e;b) is however
a task we left to future research.
26If q ￿ ￿￿￿ < 0; ci would decrease with i when
p0
i(e0)











i (e0)u(ci) < 0 ￿ v
0 (e0);
which violates the incentive compatibility constraint for e0.































￿￿i (B ￿ ci)
2
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Finally, one can show that - since ci and ￿￿i move together (and
P







28The key reference for Total Positivity is Karlin (1968).
246 Conclusions
This paper studies the two period version of the dynamic moral hazard model when agents can bor-
row and save on a risk-free bond market and their asset accumulation decisions are not observable.
We provide su￿cient conditions under which the ￿rst-order approach (FOA) is applicable in this
environment. In addition to the conditions which are required in the static and in the observable
savings case (MLR, CDF) we need to impose some further concavity on the problem. First of all,
non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) with respect to consumption is imposed. Second,
the way e￿ort e￿ects the probability distribution has to be concave enough or the disutility of e￿ort
has to be convex enough. This last requirement is guaranteed by the Frisch elasticity of leisure
being less than one. One nice property of these set of su￿cient conditions is that these restrictions
on preferences are validated by empirical research. Another attractive aspect of them is that most
popular functional forms used in applied research will satisfy these conditions. As a by-product of
our analysis we identify an interesting new characterizing property of the NIARA utility functions,
which might have a broader applicability.
With the help of the ￿rst order condition approach, we also characterize the optimal contract
in this environment, and we mostly focus on how consumption depends on output. Similarly to the
standard case, under the assumptions needed for the validity of the FOA, the optimal consumption
is monotonic in output and the result by Holmstr￿ om (1979) regarding the value of information
in moral hazard models hold in our environment as well: The agent’s consumption should vary
with income if and only if the income shock is informative about the action taken by the agent.
We also study extensively, the progressivity of the tax-transfer scheme supporting the optimal
allocation. We identify a key force in the model which makes consumption more convex and hence
the supporting tax system more regressive due to the possibility of hidden asset accumulation under
decreasing and convex absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functions.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof is based on Propositions 4 and 5 in Grossman and Hart
(1983). In order to make the analogy explicit between these results and ours, we now show in detail
the part of the proof related to Grossman and Hart’s Proposition 5 which regards our Corollary to
Proposition 1: The sub-optimality of self-insurance. It should then be easy to see how the proof of
Proposition 4 in that paper can be adapted to our environment. Further details are available upon
request.
Consider a transfer scheme ￿ that is optimal and it is such that ￿i ￿ ￿ is constant for all i > 0:
We show that this transfer scheme cannot be optimal, by constructing an incentive compatible
transfer scheme, which satis￿es the agent’s participation constraint and increases the principal’s
surplus. Without loss of generality, assume that u is unbounded below and recall that ￿N = ￿1.
Consider the following modi￿cation of the scheme: leave unchanged both ^ ￿0 (") = ￿0 and ^ ￿i(") = ￿
for i = 2;:::;N ￿1, while modify ￿1 and ￿N as follows: set ^ ￿1(") = ￿ +"; and ^ ￿N(") = ￿ ￿￿""; with
" > 0: For any "; the value ￿" is chosen so that the agent is indi￿erent between the original plan ￿
and the new one ^ ￿(")29, that is
max
e2E; b￿￿B(")
u(y0 + ￿0 ￿ qb) ￿ v(e) + ￿
N X
i=1
pi(e)u(yi + ^ ￿i(") + b)
29When u is unbounded above, we shall modify the original scheme ￿ as follows: ^ ￿0 (") = ￿0; ^ ￿i(") = ￿ for i =
2;:::;N ￿ 1; and ^ ￿1(") = ￿ + ￿
"" ; and ^ ￿N(") = ￿ ￿ ":
28= max
e2E;b￿￿B(")
u(y0 + ￿0 ￿ qb) ￿ v(e) + ￿
N￿1 X
i=2
pi(e)u(yi + ￿ + b)
+￿ [p1(e)u(y1 + ￿ + " + b) + pN(e)u(yN + ￿ ￿ ￿"" + b)]




where for each "; B(") := mini fyi + ^ ￿i(") ￿ cg; and we stick to the particular optimal contract
where b0 = 0: Such a ￿" > 0 exists by the Maximum Theorem. Notice indeed that both u and p
are continuous and by convexity and strict monotonicity, e will lie in a compact interval. Moreover,
since the transfers are constant in i, and utility is unbounded below we can always choose " in a way
that b0(") 2 B(";￿) where B(";￿) :=
h





and compact set (recall that c > ￿1). Finally, note that for each " > 0, for ￿ = 0 the utility of
the agent must be strictly larger than the one in the original contract. Since u is strictly monotone
and unbounded below, and by the full support assumption, by reducing ￿ we can drive the agent’s
utility arbitrarily low. Hence, by continuity, there must be a ￿" that satis￿es our requirement.
We want to show that for " small enough the di￿erence between the principal’s surplus under
the new and original scheme ￿(") is positive. Denote by ^ e"
0 and ^ b"
0 the e￿ort and asset choices of
the agent under the perturbed scheme, and ^ e0
0; ^ b0
0 and ￿0 are the limit e￿ort, asset and ￿" choices
as " ! 0. The Theorem of the Maximum implies that the optimal correspondence of choices ^ e"
0
and ^ b"
0 is upper hemi-continuous if considered as a function of ": The consequence is that ^ e0
0 and ^ b0
0
are also optimal under the original scheme, hence for each " > 0 we have
u
￿



















y0 + ￿0 ￿ q^ b"
0
￿














































































29Now taking limits as " ! 0 we get
0 ￿ p1(^ e0
0)u0
￿










It is now easy to realize that yN + ￿ > y1 + ￿ and strict concavity implies u0
￿






yN + ￿ +^ b0
0
￿
hence it must be that pN(^ e0
0)￿0 ￿ p1(^ e0
0) > 0:
Let us now compute the gain for the principal. For each " > 0 we have
￿(") = pN(^ e"
0)￿"" ￿ p1(^ e"
0)": (20)
Since ￿(0) = 0, by showing ￿0(0) > 0; we show that ￿(") > 0 for " small enough: Note that if






0)￿0 ￿ p1(^ e0
0) > 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) We ￿rst show that the solution of the problem (R) must be such that (7)
(the no-shirking condition) is satis￿ed with equality. If ￿ > 0 we are done. Consider the case where
￿ = 0: In this case, the ￿rst-order conditions are either ci = c for all i; or
q
￿u0(ci) ￿￿a(ci) = ￿ for all
i; hence the planner fully insures the agent in period t = 1 regardless of the value of ￿ ￿ 0. Note
that full-insurance will also be good for incentive compatibility since the convexity of u0 (implied
by NIARA) implies
P
i pi(e0)u0(ci) ￿ u0 (
P
i pi(e0)ci). That is, the planner will be able to relax
the Euler equation by providing insurance. Since
P
i p0












We now show that if the solution of the problem (R) is interior for ci, it must be such that the
second constraint in (6) (the Euler condition) is satis￿ed with equality. Recall that the ￿rst-order
conditions for c0 and ci are given by (9) and (10). Again, if ￿ > 0 we are done. If ￿ = 0; from the















where the second inequality is implied by Jensen inequality. In fact, since 1=x is a strictly convex
transformation, this second inequality can be an equality only if the agent is fully insured. Now,
comparing the ￿rst and last term in the above expression, we have qu0(c0) ￿ ￿
P
i pi(e0)u0(ci):
Combining this with (8) yields qu0(c0) = ￿
P
i pi(e0)u0(ci).
30(ii) Whenever e0 > 0 by assumption we have v0(e0) > 0. Therefore, full insurance is not feasible
so ci cannot be constant in i. This implies that ￿ > 0: In this case we also have ￿ > 0: In order to
see this, recall that with ￿ = 0 whenever ci is not constant in i the last inequality in (21) is satis￿ed
with strict inequality. This however contradicts the Euler condition qu0(c0) ￿ ￿
P
i pi(e0)u0(ci)
hence ￿ cannot be zero either.
(iii) If u is unbounded below, since U0 > ￿1; from the participation constraint we obviously
have interiority and the previous line of proof applies. So assume u is bounded. If the Inada
condition is satis￿ed and ci = c for at least one i > 0; clearly the Euler condition (8) must be
satis￿ed. If fact, it must be that c0 = c as well. Since u is bounded, (7) must be satis￿ed with
equality by the argument in (i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 (i) We ￿rst show that under NIARA
P
i p0
i (e)u0 (^ ci) ￿ 0: Note that we










pi(e) = 0: Moreover, from the ￿rst




pi(e): Therefore, by concavity, u0 (^ ci) and
p0
i(e)
pi(e) are negatively correlated, which
proves the result.




￿vee + ￿ ^ Uee
￿￿







where all terms have the obvious meaning. By the concavity of u and convexity of v; we have:
￿vee < 0; q2ucc < 0: If we now look at the expression for detH; by making the term by term
multiplications and expanding the quadratic expression, we obtain the following terms. First,
q2 (￿vee)ucc which is positive by the concavity of u and ￿v: Second, we have the expression
q2ucc ^ Uee ￿ ￿vee ^ Ucc: Both terms in the expression are positive since the concavity of u implies
^ Ucc < 0 and the CDF assumption implied by the concavity of ￿ imply that ^ Uee < 0: The only
remaining terms are ￿2 ^ Uee ^ Ucc ￿ ￿2 ^ Uec; which are those in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 Let k be the index so that ￿i = ￿ih ￿￿il ￿ 0 if and only if i ￿ k ￿ 1: Notice
that since ￿ih




i ￿il = 1; such k is well de￿ned. We aim at showing


















￿2 ￿ 1 (22)
31where ￿u
(n)
i = u(n)(^ ci) ￿ u(n)(^ ck) and we used the fact that
PN
i=1 ￿i = 0 ) ￿1 = ￿
PN
i=2 ￿i. The






















Note, that if we are able to show that
￿i￿j(￿ui￿u00
j + ￿uj￿u00
i ) ￿ 2￿i￿j￿u0
i￿u0
j for 8i;j (23)
then we will be done. Clearly if either ￿i￿j = 0; or ci = ck; or cj = ck the condition is satis￿ed
since both terms are zero. So assume that ￿i￿j 6= 0; ci 6= ck; and cj 6= ck: Now recall that since
￿0 (e) > 0 consumption increases with i: So, we have that both ￿i￿u0
i < 0 and ￿j￿u0
j < 0: We can
hence divide by ￿i￿j￿u0
i￿u0









The key aspect of our proof is to note that, if u is concave, the absolute risk aversion is decreasing
if and only if the agent is more prudent than risk averse. That is, if ￿u0 is a concave transformation
of u (see Gollier, 2001, pp. 24). In other words, there is an increasing and concave function f such
that








= ￿f0(u(c))u0(c) = f0(u(c))f(u(c)): (25)











(zi ￿ zk)(f0(zj)f(zj) ￿ f0(zk)f(zk)) + (zj ￿ zk)(f0(zi)f(zi) ￿ f0(zk)f(zk))
(f(zi) ￿ f(zk))(f(zj) ￿ f(zk))
: (26)
If zl > zk (resp. zl < zk); from the Mean value theorem, for 8l 9z￿
l 2 [zk;zl] (resp. z￿
l 2 [zl;zk])
such that
f(zl) ￿ f(zk) = f0(z￿
l )(zl ￿ zk): (27)
















































In order to obtain the ￿rst inequality, notice the following facts for both l = i;j: First, since f is
concave we have that whenever f(zl) ￿ f(zk) > 0 (resp. f(zl) ￿ f(zk) < 0) then f0(zl) ￿ f0(z￿
l ) ￿
f0(zk) (resp. f0(zl) ￿ f0(z￿
l ) ￿ f0(zk)) implying that 0 ￿
f0(zl)
f0(z￿
l ) ￿ 1 and
f0(zk)
f0(z￿
l ) ￿ 1 (resp.
f0(zl)
f0(z￿













for l = i;j: This gives the ￿rst inequality in (28). The second inequality is implied by the simple
mathematical fact that for all a > 0 we have 1




i ).30 This completes the
proof, since Pij ￿ 2 for 8i;j ￿ 1 implies Ru ￿ 1:
The proof of the su￿ciency part is very easy. Since a concave u is NIARA if and only if ￿u0 is
more concave than u; if u is not NIARA we can easily ￿nd a counterexample with some monotone
weights and (weakly) monotone consumption allocation where Pij < 2 and therefore Ru < 1: Details
are available upon request. Q.E.D.
30Since (a ￿ 1)
2 = a
2 ￿ 2a + 1 ￿ 0; dividing both sides by a > 0 one obtains a +
1
a ￿ 2 ￿ 0 as desired.
33